I. Introduction
This paper presents two simple models of how economic agents decide which of two technologies to use when the relative profitability of the technologies is unknown. In both models, agents base their decisions, at least in part, on the experience of their neighbors; this is what we mean by "social learning." We believe that social learning is frequently an important aspect of the process of technology adoption, where "technology" should be broadly construed: Although our main examples concern the adoption of agricultural technology, we believe that the models may also be applicable to the diffusion of new man-nology, provided that the technology with the higher mean payoff is also the more likely to have the higher payoff ex post. Intuitively, a strategy that is more popular today is likely to have done well in the past, so that the relative popularity of the technologies can serve as a proxy for their historical performance. Thus it is fairly clear that popularity weighting rules can lead to better decisions. We find that one particular choice of popularity weights picks out the better technology in the long run, regardless of the initial state of the system or the size of the payoff difference; however, this gain in long-run efficiency may have the cost of slowing the adoption of technological improvements.
Our second model has a heterogeneous population, with each technology better for some of the players. Thus the question here is not whether the better technology will be adopted, but rather whether the new technology will be adopted by the appropriate players.2 We suppose that there is a continuum of players distributed uniformly over a line and that nearby players have similar payoffs to the two technologies. Moreover, we suppose that players base their decisions on the relative performance of the two technologies at locations that are within one "window width" of their own. This window width, which is exogenous in our model, can be thought of either as the result of an informational constraint-players may not observe outcomes at faraway locations-or as the result of the players' prior belief that faraway locations are sufficiently different that experiences there are not relevant to their own decisions.
Once again, players revise their technology choices using simple rules of thumb. In particular, we suppose that players do not know exactly how location influences relative payoffs and thus simply compare the average payoffs of the two technologies in their window, as opposed to using more sophisticated statistical methods.
The heterogeneous population model provides a number of predictions about the types and magnitudes of the errors that are likely to be made. The spatial nature of the process allows some degree of social learning even without popularity weighting, and the long-run state of the system is approximately efficient when the window width is small. However, small window widths imply that the system converges more slowly, which can be costly if the initial state is far from the optimum. Roughly speaking, increasing the popularity weighting in the spatial model has about the same effect as decreasing the window width, improving long-run performance while slowing conver-gence. In contrast to the homogeneous-population model, no amount of popularity weighting will lead to an exactly efficient long-run state.
The assumptions of our models are perhaps most descriptive of the diffusion of agricultural technologies. We would expect that farmers are able to observe, at least roughly, the output of their neighbors as well as their neighbors' choices of crops and techniques. Further, farmers' payoffs are subject to aggregate stochastic shocks due to the weather. Concerning inertia, it has been frequently noted that farmers as a group seem very hesitant to try new technologies. These comments do not suggest that all farmers are equally hesitant; for example, Slicher von Bath (1963, p. 243) notes that during the English agricultural revolution, "land tilled in very ancient ways lay next to fields in which crop rotations were followed." Even during the twentieth century, there is typically a substantial lag between the date farmers first learn of the existence of a technology and the date they adopt it: Ryan and Gross (1943) found that farmers in two rural communities on average adopted hybrid seed corn 7 years after they first heard of the innovation, with adoption spread over a 5-10-year period; studies cited in Rogers and Shoemaker (1971, p. 129) report lags of 2-4 years for the adoption of weed spray in Iowa and fertilizer in Pakistan.3 Finally, when capital and insurance markets are poorly developed, it seems plausible that farmers' technology decisions will be determined primarily by short-term considerations, and that farmers will be unlikely to experiment with a technology with a lower expected return.
As for the assumptions of the heterogeneous model, it seems plausible that the payoffs to various crops may differ at different locations, depending on the soil, climate, and terrain of each farm, and that when a new technology is first introduced there may be considerable uncertainty about where it should be used. Consequently, the fact that the technology did well in one area or country may not provide much reason to adopt it in another.4
These various features seem particularly clear in the diffusion of the agricultural practices known as the "new husbandry" during the English agricultural revolution. (The new husbandry refers to a vari-3 Note that the spread of literacy and modern communication media will speed up the rate at which farmers become aware of a new technology's existence, but they do not seem to have eliminated the lag between becoming informed and deciding to adopt. 4 Centrally based agricultural reformers are often hampered by their lack of understanding of the variation in farmers' tastes and production costs. For example, Apodaca (1952) describes how a planner tried to induce a New Mexico community to adopt a hybrid corn. The innovation was adopted and then discontinued despite doubling yields since the villagers decided that the taste and consistency of the corn were inappropriate for making tortillas.
ety of new crops and new crop rotations that arrived in England from
Flanders in the seventeenth century, based on the idea of growing crops such as clover or turnips instead of leaving the land fallow; see, e.g., Kerridge [1967] , Timmer [1969] , and Mingay [1977] .) In particular, the new husbandry was attempted and then abandoned at a number of locations, which shows both that the returns to the technology varied with location and that the form of this dependence was not known.
The spatial structure of the heterogeneous-population model can be taken literally when the model is applied to agricultural innovations. We believe that the model can also be applied to other settings, such as the diffusion of management practices in large industries or the choice of private schools; the location variable should be interpreted as a point in characteristic space, and individuals with similar characteristics believe that their payoffs are similar.
Turning from the assumptions of the models to the conclusions, we note that the homogeneous-population model predicts that the speed with which a new technology is adopted is correlated with the extent of the payoff difference. Such a correlation between the extent of improvement and the speed of adoption has been noted in the empirical discussions of Mansfield (1968) and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), but has not, as far as we know, been addressed in the learning literature.5 The homogeneous-population model also predicts that new technologies that result in a small probability of a big improvement and a large probability of a small loss will be adopted slowly, if at all; this is consistent with the slow diffusion of seat belts and vaccinations noted by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971, p. 139) . Further, the fact that the combination of inertia and popularity weighting can lead to efficient long-run behavior in the homogeneous-population model may make the apparent occurrence of these phenomena less puzzling. Likewise, in the heterogeneous-population model, the parameter values that favor long-run efficiency-namely, small window widths and high popularity weights-lead to slow diffusion. This may help to explain the observed slow diffusion of some agricultural technologies.6
There have been several previous models of the role of social learning in technology adoption. Perhaps the earliest is the contagion process, which models adoption as a random matching process in which players switch to the new technology the first time they meet someone 5However, the correlation is easy to explain as the result of an optimal investment policy under complete information if adopting the innovation requires investing in a capital good. 6 The most striking case of slow diffusion may be that of the new husbandry, which diffused at a rate of 1 mile per year both in England and in France. who is using it. This process yields the familiar "S-shaped curve" for the time path of adoption that has been widely used in empirical work, for example by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1968) .
Recent papers by Banerjee (1992, in press), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), and Smith (1992) study more sophisticated models of social learning in homogeneous populations, in which players must decide which of two choices is better. The primary question of interest in these models is whether social learning implies that the population eventually identifies the better choice. These papers suppose that players observe one another's choices, but that players do not observe the payoffs that these choices generate. Manski (1990) considers estimation procedures for an individual agent in a heterogeneous population; he does not analyze the resulting social dynamics.
Although we believe that the models we develop, based on bounded rationality and players' observance of their opponents' payoffs, are a useful supplement to this previous work on social learning, we should say that we are not completely satisfied with the precise form of the rules we consider. In particular, in the first model, use of history does not seem so complicated as to be unreasonable.' Our purpose is not to argue that any one of these models is particularly compelling, but rather to identify general properties that seem to occur in some of the more obvious formulations. One recurrent conclusion is that in a number of cases the long-run state of the system is fairly efficient, even though the individual decision rules are quite naive.
II. A Simple Model of Homogeneous Populations
Before we consider social learning in systems with a heterogeneous population, it is interesting to consider the simpler case in which the same technology is optimal for all players. This model can be thought of as describing behavior at a single site in the model we consider later on, where the relative payoffs vary with location. Suppose that there is a large (continuum) population of players at a single site, each of whom must choose whether to use technology or technology g. In each period, all players using the same technology receive the same payoff.9 We suppose that the payoffs to the two technologies at date t, uf and ug, are related by the equation U9-f = 0 + Et,(1) 7Cross (1983) develops a model of boundedly rational adaptive choice with a similar information structure. 8 In the second model the environment is complicated enough that a great many periods would be required to obtain good estimates, as we discuss in Sec. III. 9 Given our assumption that players observe one another's payoffs, nothing would be changed if we allowed each player's payoff to be subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In the initial period, denoted zero, a fraction x0 of the players are using technology g. After each period, a fraction a of the players are selected at random to have the opportunity to revise their choices.'0 We suppose that the players who are revising their choices can observe the average payoffs of both technologies in the previous period. The simplest behavior rule we consider is the "unweighted" rule under which all players who revise their choice pick the technology that did best in the preceding period. Under this adjustment rule, the evolution of the system is described by Note that players treat the adoption and discontinuance decisions symmetrically, which corresponds to the case in which the costs of "transition" are small. This symmetry is probably extreme, but we think that it may be preferable to the standard practice in modeling technology diffusion, which supposes that once agents try the new innovation they continue using it forever: Studies of the English agricultural revolution, as well as studies of more recent innovations cited in Rogers and Shoemaker (1971, p. 115) , suggest that the amount of discontinuance is an important factor in the diffusion process.
Our model supposes that players do not have access to the entire history of payoff observations. To justify this assumption, we suppose that individual players revise their choices too infrequently to want to keep track of each period's results and, more strongly, that the market at this particular "location" is too small for a record-keeping agency to provide this service. Also, the private gain from using history may be small in the cases, detailed below, in which the system without history converges to the efficient outcome.
The following result is standard; it follows from, for example, theo-10 As mentioned in the Introduction, this inertia is consistent with the empirical evidence that there is often a substantial lag between the time individuals first learn of the existence of a new technology and the time they adopt it. The inertia might come from decision costs; it would also arise if the choice of a technology is embodied in a costly capital good that will not be replaced until it wears out. rem 10 of Norman (1968) . (It is also a consequence of part b of proposition 2 below.) PROPOSITION 1. The system (2) is ergodic; that is, the time average of x, converges to its expectation with respect to its unique invariant measure pu. Moreover, E ,(x) = p, and var,(x) = p(I -p)xt1(2 -at).
III. A Single Location with Popularity Weighting
Proposition 1 says that observing the long-run fraction of players using technology g reveals the fraction of the time in which g has been the better choice. If the distribution H of E is symmetric or nearly so, the technology that is more often better has the higher expected payoff." This suggests that if all other players in the population are choosing whichever technology has the highest current score, each player could gain by considering the relative popularity of the two technologies as well as the recent payoffs. Intuitively, the current popularity provides some information about the past history of the process and, thus, can serve as a proxy for it.
Of course, if all players consider popularity in guiding their choices, the level of popularity becomes less informative, and in the extreme case in which players consider only popularity, the popularity conveys no information at all. This leads us to consider the behavior of the system when all players give popularity an intermediate weight. As we shall see, there are popularity weights that, if used by all players, lead them all to adopt the better technology. One way to interpret this result is that in this case, even when popularity weighting is used by all players, the popularity remains a "sufficient statistic" for the history.
To explore the idea of popularity weighting, we develop a simple parametric model. As above, we consider a continuum of players and suppose that only a fraction a of them update their choices each period. Now, though, instead of choosing the technology that did best last period, the choice rule is Thus when Vf < 0, so that the system cannot "lock on" to downward steps, the probability of an upward step is uniformly bounded away from zero. Similarly, ifxg > 1, the probability of a downward step is uniformly bounded away from zero.
The discussion above shows that (with knife-edge cases ignored) there are four possibilities for the long-run behavior of the system: (1) If xg < 1 and Vf < 0, the system is certain to eventually make enough upward jumps that xt > xg, so that from any initial position 12 The empirical literature suggests that popularity weighting is a factor, but reliable estimates of m are hard to come by. Rogers and Shoemaker (1971, p. 142) say that "many students of peasant life feel" that innovations must be 20-30 percent better to be adopted; they also cite a President's Science Advisory Committee figure of 50-100 percent. From our reading, it is not clear whether these premia reflect popularity weighting or switching costs. 13 An alternative explanation of the need for resealing is to use the fact that the rule m = a yields the optimal long-run decision. Since u is the standard deviation of the payoff differences per period, resealing the utility function rescales a in the same way. the system converges with probability one to x, -1. (2) If xg > 1 and f > 0, the system converges to x, = 0 from any initial position. (3) If 0 < f and xg < 1, the system will converge (with probability one) to zero if xo ' xf and will converge to one if xO ? xg; for xO E (xf, xg), the system will also eventually converge to a steady state, but it has a positive probability of ending up at each of the two steady states of the system. (4) If Vf < 0 and xg > 1, the system will not converge to either steady state. Instead, the fraction xt will continue to fluctuate.
These observations do most of the work required to establish the following claims. Proof. Increasing m increases the set of 0's for which the system converges to the better choice and increases the "tilt" of the mean toward the better choice for smaller 0's. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that the system is certain to converge to the correct choice if the popularity weight m = or and that the payoff loss from a wrong choice must be small if m is close to this level. Thus it is interesting to ask whether there is any particular reason to suppose that popularity weights equal or close to Cr are likely to be used or, conversely, whether there are forces in the model that would drive the players to use different weights. As a partial response, our working paper (Ellison and Fudenberg 1992) considers a game in which players simultaneously choose their individual popularity weights, and it shows that the optimal weight m = Cr is its unique equilibrium outcome. This result is only a partial response because it supposes more sophistication in the determination of the popularity weights than we find compelling. However, the result does show that popularity weighting need not conflict with individual incentives. We conjecture that optimal popularity weighting might emerge from an adaptive process because individuals have a private incentive to increase m whenever m < (x.
The reader may be concerned that the results in proposition 2 seem to rely on the fact that the uniform distribution has compact support: an observation that ug -uf > C implies that 0 > 0. However, similar conclusions can be obtained without compact support. Appendix A shows that the nonlinear rule "switch only if the observed payoff difference is large compared to the popularity" leads to a long-run distribution that places most of its weight on the better choice whenever the distribution of errors is "infinitely revealing in the tails." This nonlinear rule has the additional advantage that it does not depend on the exact form of the distribution of the noise, whereas the optimal linear rule for the uniform distribution must be tailored to the distribution's support. Appendix A also reports simulations of a more complex rule that seems to work well even when the tails are not infinitely revealing.
While our formal results concern the eventual steady state of the system, the speed of convergence is of some interest as well. In particular, consider an initial position in which x0 is small, so that g corresponds to a "new" technology, and suppose that 0 > 0, so that the new technology is in fact an improvement. Then the share of technology g increases whenever 0 + et > m(l -2x,); since the probability of this event increases with 0, so does the expected rate of adoption.'4 As we noted in the Introduction, such a correlation between the extent of improvement and the speed of adoption has been noted in empirical work.
Note also that for fixed 0, the speed of convergence decreases as af increases, so that each period's observation becomes less informative. Furthermore, if the new technology usually does slightly worse than the old one but occasionally does much better (i.e., if the new technology has a higher mean payoff but a lower median), then naive learning rules that look only at the recent relative performance will be biased toward the wrong choice. This is consistent with the observation that seat belts, insurance, and vaccinations have been slow to diffuse.
Finally, before leaving the homogeneous-population framework, we would like to report simulation results for one simple modification of popularity weighting that seems to improve the short-run performance of the system without changing its long-run behavior. We now suppose that players consider "trends" in the relative popularity of the two technologies as well as the popularity itself.
More precisely, suppose that players now choose technology g iff the realized difference in payoffs ug -uf exceeds the expression m(l -2x,) -c(xt -xt-1), where xt -xt-1 is the trend in popularity.
Since the trend variable converges to zero along any path in which the system converges to a steady state, the system still converges to the better technology with probability one when m = a. However, if the initial state is far from the optimum, as is the case when a superior technology is first introduced, one would expect that responsiveness to trends would help to increase the speed with which the new technology is adopted.
To test this intuition, we ran three simulations, each with the noise term e uniformly distributed on [-ar, a] and popularity weighting m = a. In the first, the fraction a who adjust each period was .5, and the mean payoff difference 0 was .5u; in the second, a = .5 and 0 = .lo; in the third, a = .1 and 0 = .02cr. In all cases, we counted the number of periods required for the system to move from initial state xO = .05ar to x = .99o. The results, reported in table 1, show that trends can improve the speed of convergence. 
IV. Heterogeneous Populations with Linear Technologies
Now we turn to the study of heterogeneous populations, in which different technologies may be optimal for different individuals. With this parameterization, 13 > 0 implies that technology g does better at "good" locations, and 13 < 0 implies that g does better at bad ones. The player's location in 0-space determines his average payoff to the two technologies. We suppose that players base their decisions on the average performance of the two technologies at locations in their "observation windows"; the observation window of the player at 0 is the interval [0 -w, 0 + w]. We call w the "window width."
As in the study of a homogeneous population, we begin by analyzing the simple rule in which players use whichever technology did better in their window last period; later we shall enrich the model to allow for popularity weighting. To define this rule formally, suppose that the distribution of players over locations has a constant density, which we normalize to equal one, and let i-g ( 
In the previous sections we considered a model with a continuum of players and inertia, so that the fraction of players using each strategy can never shrink all the way to zero in finite time. In our study of spatial models, though, we shall suppose that there is no inertia at individual locations, so that all players at each location revise their choices each period. We do so in part for reasons of convenience and in part because learning seems too easy when all players observe the payoffs to both technologies in every period. Moreover, it seems plausible that in rural areas with low population density a technology could be abandoned by everyone in an observation window after a few bad draws in succession.
We have two interpretations in mind for this model. First, the location parameter 0 may correspond to geographical location, with the performance of the technologies linked to variables such as climate or terrain that are in turn correlated with location. Second, the model may describe adoption decisions at a single village, where players are differentiated by idiosyncratic payoff-relevant characteristics such as wealth and household size. We want to think of the payoff-relevant variables as being unobservable but correlated with the observed locations. The idea is that players do not know exactly which aspects of their locations are payoff-relevant or how these aspects influence their payoffs. This is why we do not allow the players to regress the observed payoffs of each technology on the corresponding values of 0. When one is studying geographic diffusion, the observation window might reflect the player only observing the outputs of his neighbors, and the window width w might be fairly small. When one is studying adoption at a single site, the observation window corresponds to the players' beliefs about which other players are sufficiently similar for their experiences to be relevant, and players might well observe the actions and outcome of others who are outside of their window. To the extent that the relevant characteristics are difficult to determine, the window widths in this interpretation might be fairly large.'5
As a first step in analyzing the decision rule (6), suppose that the noise terms Elt and E2t are identically zero, so that the system is deter- 15 In both interpretations, players might prefer to weight observations of their immediate neighbors more heavily than those of players who are farther away but still within the observation window; this may be particularly attractive when the observation window is large. so that if the player at 0' plays g in period t + 1, then so does the player at 0". Hence the state at period t + 1 is described by a cutoff rule. Our analysis restricts attention to the evolution of these cutoffs. Given our assumption that the payoff difference between the two technologies is monotone in location, cutoff rules seem natural; one might suspect that even if the initial state is not a cutoff rule, the system will converge to one. However, we have not attempted to verify this result because in the absence of a cutoff rule the system is much harder to analyze.
A steady-state cutoff rule must have the property that the player at the steady-state cutoff is indifferent between f and g given his observations. Thus the steady state is the unique solution of -u7 ( decisions. Note that the maximum steady-state payoff loss at any location is the absolute value of 0*, which is small if ,3 is not too large (in absolute value) and the window width w is small. Having determined the steady-state cutoff, we next examine the behavior of the system away from the steady state. It is easy to show that, from an initial cutoff 00, the cutoff will move toward the steady state 0* at a distance of w each period until it is within w12 of 0*. Once 0, is within this interval, the system typically enters a stable two-period cycle about 0*. For ease of reference, we summarize this as a proposition. PROPOSITION 3. From an initial cutoff 00, the system determined by (6) and (7) PROPOSITION 5. When the zt are i.i.d. draws from a distribution that has a strictly positive density on a compact support, the dynamic process generated by (10) has a unique invariant distribution F, and the expected probability distribution at date t converges to F uniformly over initial probability distributions pt.
Proof. Appendix C shows that the system is a random contraction in the sense of Norman (1972) and satisfies uniqueness condition 2.11 of Futia (1982) . Note that system ( 11) differs from (10) only when t falls in an interval of width w. Normally we think of the variance of zt as being much larger than the window width; in this case it may be reasonable to guess that the invariant distributions of (10) and (11) are close together. We should point out that the simplified system (11), unlike (10), does not have a unique invariant distribution: Because all steps have size w, from initial position 00, the support of (1 1) is concentrated on the grid Oo + kw, and so different initial conditions lead to different invariant distributions. Moreover, the supports of the date t distribution are different for t even and for t odd. Despite these qualitative differences between systems (10) and (1 1), the absolute magnitude of the effect of the initial condition is small when w is small, which supports the conjecture that the two systems are similar. Table 2 provides further support for this belief by comparing Monte Carlo estimates of the steady-state variance of (10) with the variance of the particular invariant distribution of (11) that is computed in proposition 6 below. As conjectured, the two variances are close when w is small.
To examine the invariant distributions of (11) Remark. -Recall that the mean of this distribution is 0*, its variance is uw/2, and the distribution is asymptotically normal as w tends to zero.
Proof. To show thatf is an invariant distribution, it is sufficient to verify that it meets the "detailed balance condition" that, for all 0 and 0', the (unconditional) probability flow from 0 to 0' equals the probability flow in the reverse direction. Thus we shall verify that While small w's are thus desirable from the viewpoint of the time average payoff, they entail a significant short-run welfare loss when the initial state is far from the optimum, because in this case the system will take a long time to approach the neighborhood of the optimum. This is true for two reasons: First, ot is limited to move at most w per period. Second, in the presence of noise, a typical path is likely to take far more than O01w periods to reach a neighborhood of 0*, because many steps will be taken in the wrong direction.
For a fixed initial condition and social discount factor, the socially optimal window width will trade off the speed of convergence and the steady-state variance, with larger w's being optimal the farther the initial condition is from zero. If the social planner does not know the initial condition or the location of the social optimum, the size of the optimal w will depend on the planner's prior beliefs. This trade-off between speed of adjustment and the variance of the steady state seems a natural feature of the sorts of model we consider.'7
At this point we would like to make a few observations about how the conclusions might change if the players did keep records of their past observations. Since players at locations within or of 0* will play both technologies infinitely often, they could eventually learn which technology is better for themselves by keeping such records. However, a few calculations suggest that this learning process will be fairly slow if the random shock to the payoffs has a sizable common component and w is small. To see this, suppose that the payoffs to each technology are subject to a common shock nt as well as the idiosyncratic shocks we assumed before, so that system (5) is replaced by Ug(0) = 0 + 10 + Elt + Ott (5') U{(0) = 10 + E2t + Ott~ 16 Although our leading example of very small window widths is the English agricultural revolution, small window widths should not be seen as requiring illiterate agents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers often distrust the information of central authorities and experts, and prefer to see how innovations work out in their neighborhood. As noted earlier, Ryan and Gross (1943) found that the experiences of neighbors were an important factor in the adoption of hybrid seed corn by twentieth-century Iowa farmers.
17Although we have not checked the details, it seems that a combination of large window widths with a rule of proximity-weighted averages could combine faster convergence with a small long-run variance.
If the variance of mt is relatively large, then observations of only one technology at date t are not very informative, and only observations of both technologies in the same period will be helpful. Players at locations far from 0* rarely see both technologies played and hence would need a very long memory to learn. Players at locations 0 closer to 0* do see both technologies played more often. For these players the systematic payoff difference between the technologies is smaller, and hence it may require many observations to be fairly confident that one is better. Our informal approximations, reported in Appendix E, suggest that this is indeed the case and, in particular, that the number of periods required to be fairly confident which technology is better is on the order of (urlw)312; when w is small, a very long history would be required for players to do much better than with our simple rule. Of course, players could use history even when the advantage to doing so is slight or slow to develop, but in these cases it seems less obvious that players would be led to abandon simple rules.
V. Examples of Nonlinear Technologies
Before considering the implications of popularity weighting in a heterogeneous population, we would like to discuss some examples of what can happen without popularity weighting when the payoffs as a function of location do not take the linear form presumed in equation (5). Suppose, for example, that the "old" technologyf has returns that are identically zero, and g(O) = cos(O), so that regions in which g is optimal alternate with regions in which f is. If there is no noise in the system and the window width is relatively small, then even if all players in locations 0 E [--aI2, r/2] adopt the new technology g, the new technology will not spread to the other regions in which it is optimal. In this example there are substantial social gains from having the new technology "tested" at a number of diverse locations. It may also be interesting to note that when the local process may fail to spread as widely as it should, random shocks to payoffs can increase social welfare; that is, welfare can increase as the variance of the noise term zt increases from zero. Suppose that the technologies aref(O) = o and g(O) = cos(0), and that the initial state has all players to the right of 00 using g and players to the left using f. Without noise, the cutoff will move to 0* -3rrI2 and stay there (see fig. 2 ). When the support of zt is sufficiently large, there will eventually be enough consecutive draws of very negative zt that the cutoff reaches r/2. From this point, the system may no longer have a single cutoff, since players to the left of r/2 will tend to switch to g and those to the right switch back to f. Essentially, the noise leads the players in region II ) and w(dg/dO) , which bound the difference between the payoffs at 0 -w and 0 + w. Thus if w is small, the difference in payoffs If -gI must be small as well in order for the inferior technology to dominate; hence even though the wrong technology is adopted everywhere, the payoff loss at each location is not substantial. (In the example above, the payoff loss at each location is E, and E must be less than w in order for g to dominate.)
For small window widths, a more substantial payoff loss arises when the new technology is not adopted in a region in which it is a substantial improvement. This was the case in the example in which g = cos(0) and f = 0, so that the regions in which g should be adopted are disconnected. We can also modify the example of figure 3 so that g is better than f at every location (and so in particular is better on a at these extreme values, it will be driven out of the population before it can be tried in the center region.
VI. Heterogeneous Populations and Popularity Weighting
Our analysis of social learning in homogeneous populations showed that popularity weighting could improve the aggregate performance of the learning process. We shall now investigate the implications of popularity weighting Since the analysis of this system is quite close to that of the system without popularity weighting, we shall give the results without proof. As in Section IV, if the state in period t corresponds to a cutoff rule, so will the state in period t + 1. In addition, without noise terms the system has the same, unique, steady-state cutoff 0* = -(2 I + 1) w/2. However, the introduction of popularity weighting does change the dynamics in two ways. First, in the absence of noise terms, the system converges to the steady-state cutoff from any initial cutoff; the oscillations described in proposition 3 do not arise. Second (and relatedly), movements of less than one window width become more common since players are more hesitant to use a less popular technology.
The following proposition gives a more precise description of the dynamics. PROPOSITION 7. From an initial cutoff 00, the system described by decision rule (12) and payoffs (5) evolves according to Note also that for a given t, the system will move less than a full window width whenever the realization of 0* is in an interval of width 2m + w. This shows that popularity weighting makes the system more "sluggish" and suggests that it will reduce the variance of the long-run distribution. To verify this intuition and determine the extent to which popularity weighting reduces the variance, we characterize the long-run distribution in one special case. The welfare consequences of increasing m for fixed w are similar to those of decreasing w for fixed m: in both cases, the steady-state distribution becomes more efficient, whereas the speed at which the system converges decreases. It may be interesting to note, however, that in this simple model there is one way to change the parameters to speed up the rate of convergence (when the initial cutoff is far from the optimum) without altering the steady-state variance, namely, increasing the window width w while holding the ratio of wim fixed.'8
VII. Concluding Remarks
The various models we have presented suggest that even very naive learning rules can lead to quite efficient long-run social states, at least if the environment is not too highly nonlinear. Moreover, popularity weighting can contribute to this long-run efficiency, and the use of popularity weighting passes a crude first-cut test of consistency with individual incentives. Of course, there are many other plausible specifications of behavior rules for social learning, so it is interesting to speculate about the robustness of our conclusions.
We discussed one extension, the use of trends, in Section III. There are a number of other extensions that we have not considered but that seem important. Players might use rules of thumb that make some use of historical data. Also, players might be arranged in more complex networks than the simple linear structure we have considered. In addition, our results suppose that rules of thumb are exogenous. It would be interesting to complement these results with an 18 However, as w increases, the specification bias grows. When w is large, it may be more natural to suppose that players weight the experience of those nearby more than that of those who are farther away but still within their window.
analysis of a dynamic process by which players adjust their rules of thumb along with their choice of technology.
Finally, we should point out that popularity weighting is not always as beneficial as our results might suggest. Consider the problem of children in a poor neighborhood choosing whether to pursue higher education. If students who have done so in the past tend to move out of the neighborhood and past residents are underrepresented in the observation window, then the choice of higher education will appear less popular than it really is, and decisions based on popularity may be biased against this choice.'9 Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) suggests that the limit of the ergodic distributions will be concentrated on the better technology. To establish this formally, we partition the interval into a large number of (appropriately chosen) small subintervals and approximate the original system by two finitestate Markov processes, whose ergodic distributions will serve as bounds on the ergodic distribution of the original system. We then use the discrete-time, finite-state translation of Freidlin and Wentzell's results (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993; Young 1993) to confirm the intuition above; that is, the limits of the ergodic distributions of the finite-state process are concentrated on the subinterval corresponding to the better choice.
The discussion above suggests that infinitely revealing tails are sufficient for there to be a single popularity rule that is approximately optimal for all 0. Moreover, this rule has the nice feature that it need not be tailored to the exact form of the distribution. Even when the tails are not infinitely revealing, however, there is another popularity rule that seems to perform very well, namely choose g iff ug -u 2> F-1 (I -xt). Although the system may converge to the wrong technology with positive probability, simulations for the logistic and Laplace distributions (which both have nonrevealing tails) suggest that when at is small the system is very likely to converge to the right choice. Table Al displays one set of simulations, for the case 0 = .2or, xO = .2or. The table suggests that the behavior for all three distributions is similar, even though the latter two do not have infinitely revealing tails. Intuitively, when at is small, the system evolves through a series of small steps that allow the drift to outweigh the random forces. We conjecture that there may be a general result along these lines. distribution Q on the z's does not depend on the current state, and so in particular it is continuous in the state, and the map (p(0, z) defined by Ot+l = P(0t, Z) is easily seen to be continuous in 0 for fixed z, so that (10) is indeed a random dynamical system. Next we check that it is a random contraction, as in Futia's definition 6.2. Because the map Q is constant in 0, the constant M in part a of the definition can be taken to equal zero. Next we must show that for all z and all 0 $ 0', d (p(0, z), p(0', z)) 5 d(0, 0') , and for all 0 and 0', there is a positive probability of z such that d (p(0, z), p(0', z) The last step in the proof is to verify that (10') satisfies Futia's uniqueness condition 2.11, which requires that there be a point 00 such that, for any neighborhood U of 00 and any 0, there is an n such that when the system begins at 0, it has a positive probability of being in U in period n. It is easy to see that, for example, 00 = 0* satisfies this condition. Q.E.D. 
